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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
III. Conclusion
The decisions of the courts in interpreting and applying General
Municipal Law Section 50-e illustrated that in this area of the law,
we are approaching the periphery of the realm of law wherein the
technicality is preeminent. This is regrettable in the light of the
fact that municipalities are projecting themselves into more and more
fields 54 formerly peopled by individuals and private corporations,
whose responsibility to respond in tort is not so protected by the en-
crustation of technical requirements which are utilized by munici-
palities to frustrate substantive rights. It is true that the treasuries
of municipalities must be protected against the importunities of
fraudulent and sleeping claimants, yet this end may be attained with-
out concomitantly frustrating the rights of honest, but humanly re-
miss, claimants. The original draft of the Judicial Council prof-
fered a system by which that end could be attained and rights
preserved. A necessary preliminary to the adoption of such a system
is the institution, by the bench and the bar, of an educational cam-
paign dedicated to the apprisal of the public and the Legislature of
the inadequacies of the present statute. In the interim, we can hope
for the adoption of the renewed recommendations of the Judicial
Council, which would serve to some extent to alleviate the inequities
still pervading this area of the law.55
PATRICK FALVEY.
A PROPOSED REFORM IN THE LAW AFFECTING SHAREHOLDERS'
DERIVATIVE AcTIONs.-That New York legislation has become a
model for many states is due to a great extent to the salutary efforts
of its Law Revision Commission and Judicial Council which study
54 Note that in the case of an adult claimant, N. Y. GEx. MIUNic. LAW
§ 50-e does not apply in respect to a claim against the New York Housing
Authority, Matter of Kaufman v. New York Housing Authority, 188 Misc.
877, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 174 (Sup. Ct. 1946), af'd, 272 App. Div. 829, 70 N. Y. S.
2d 329 (2d Dep't 1947). However, in the case of an infant claimant, sub-
division six thereof has been implemented to amend the unverified notice of
claim served upon the New York Housing Authority, Matter of Belardinelli
v. New York Housing Authority, 187 Misc. 920, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 94 (Sup. Ct.
1946). It is not necessary to expatiate upon the statement that the number of
claims against the City of New York based on tort will increase appreciably
due to the city's absorption of the subway system.
55 15 REP. JUDICIAL CouNci. 76 (1949). Note that these renewed recom-
mendations are a reiteration of those made in 12 REP. JUDIciAL CouNcii. 59-
60 (1946) which pertained only to extending the period to ninety days and to
the removal of the prerequisite to relief under subdivision six, that the appli-
cation be made before trial, etc. It is hoped that the scope of the recom-
mendations will be enlarged in the future to include proposals for the revision
of the present statute by which it would approach the liberality of the original
draft proffered by the Judicial Council.
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proposed statutory enactments and offer recommendations. Inquiry
is in order, therefore, when an amendment which in effect precludes
the prosecution of the shareholders' derivative action, is passed by
the legislature against these recommendations.
In approving the enactment of Section 61-b ' of the N. Y.
General Corporation Law, Governor Thomas E. Dewey in his mem-
orandum, made the following comment upon stockholders' derivative
actions: "In recent years a veritable racket of baseless lawsuits ac-
companied by many unethical practices has grown up in this field.
Worse yet, many suits that were well based have been brought, not
in the interest of the corporation or its stockholders, but in order to
obtain money for particular individuals who had no interest in the
corporation or its stockholders. Secret settlements-really pay-offs
for silence--have been the subjects of common suspicion." 2
To preclude extortionate practices in the form of derivative suits,
Section 61-b requires the plaintiffs in such a suit to give security for
expenses which will be incurred by the corporation in defending such
an action unless the plaintiffs possess shares of stock exceeding in
value the sum of fifty thousand dollars or own at least five per cent
of the outstanding capital stock.
This article proposes to illustrate: (1) The present law in New
York in respect to derivative suits; (2) California's attempt to
regulate the derivative suit; (3) the unsolved problem and (4) a rec-
ommendation therefor.
New York View
The derivative suit is the shareholder's only remedy for breach
of trust on the part of those entrusted with the management and
direction of the corporation.3 The shareholder sues in the right of
'The full text of the statute is as follows: "In any action instituted or
maintained in the right of any foreign or domestic corporation by the holder
or holders of less than five per cent of the outstanding shares of any class of
such corporations' stock or voting trust certificates, unless the shares or voting
trust certificates held by such holder or holders have a market value in excess
of fifty thousand dollars, the corporation in whose right such action is brought
shall be entitled at any stage of the proceedings before final judgment to re-
quire the plaintiff or plaintiffs to give security for the reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees, which may be incurred by it in connection with such
action by the other parties defendant in connection therewith for which it may
become subject pursuant to section sixty-four of this chapter, to which the
corporation shall have recourse in such amounts as the court having jurisdiction
shall determine upon the termination of such action. The amount of such
security may thereafter be increased or decreased in the discretion of the court
having jurisdiction of such action upon showing that the security provided has
or may become inadequate or is excessive."
2 Lapchak v. Baker, 298 N. Y. 89, 94, 80 N. E. 2d 751, 753 (1948), citing
Public Papers of Governor Dewey, p. 255 (1944).
3 This derivative suit must be distinguished from the shareholders' rep-
resentative suit which may be brought by one or more shareholders as rep-
resentatives of a class where the members of the class are too numerous to be
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the corporation to whom the claim arising from official misconduct
belongs 4 and, consequently the period of time within which the share-
holder may sue is measured by the limitation which would apply
had the corporation itself instituted suit.5 As a condition precedent
to the bringing of the action, the shareholder must show not only
a wrong done to the corporation but also a refusal by the corporation
to redress the wrong.6 But if the directors at the time of commence-
ment of suit are the same individuals who have committed the
wrongs,7 or if the wrongs complained of have been ratified by the
corporation,8 no demand is necessary.
The shareholder who sues in the right of the corporation joins
the corporation as party defendant.9 In New York it has been held
that the complaining stockholder has complete dominion over his
derivative action, and may continue, compromise, abandon or dis-
continue it at his pleasure.' 0 There is no doubt that a final judgment
in a derivative suit, even if entered by consent," is res adjudicata and
bars other shareholders from pursuing the same corporate cause of
action.' 2 However, it would seem that settlement or compromise
even if made under judicial supervision does not bind shareholders
not joined in the suit so as to preclude them from later asserting the
same cause of action.'3
named and joined as actual parties plaintiff. The representative suit is brought
to enforce an individual right of each member of the class whereas the de-
rivative suit is brought by the shareholder to enforce a right of the corporate
entity. See STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 167 (2d ed. 1949).
4 Robertson v. Schoonmaker, 158 Misc. 627, 285 N. Y. Supp. 204 (Sup.
Ct. 1935).
5 Potter v. Walker, 159 Misc. 339, 287 N. Y. Supp. 806 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
6 Hornstein v. Paramount Pictures, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 404 (1942), aff'd, 266
App. Div. 659, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 210 (1st Dep't 1943), appeal denied, 266 App.
Div. 828, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 751 (1st Dep't 1943), aff'd, 292 N. Y. 468, 55 N. E.
2d 740 (1943).
r McQuade v. Cook, 193 Misc. 435, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 495 (Sup. Ct. 1948);
Guttmann v. Conda Co., 249 App. Div. 621, 290 N. Y. Supp. 874 (2d Dep't
1936).
8 McCrea v. Robertson, 192 N. Y. 150, 84 N. E. 960 (1908); Kavanaugh
v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 181 N. Y. 121, 73 N. E. 562 (1905).
9 Security Trust Co. v. Pritchard, 201 App. Div. 142, 194 N. Y. Supp. 486
(4th Dep't 1922).
10 Manufacturer's Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hopson, 176 Misc. 220, 25 N. Y. S.
2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 288 N. Y. 668, 43 N. E. 2d 71 (1942) (a stipu-
lation of discontinuance is effectual to terminate action); Hershfeld v. Fitz-
gerald, 157 N. Y. 166, 51 N. E. 997 (1898); Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 99
N. Y. 185, 1 N. E. 663 (1885). See 4 CooK, CORPORATIONS 3286 (8th ed.
1923).
"Gerith Realty Co. v. Normandie Natural Sec. Corp., 154 Misc. 615, 276
N. Y. Supp. 655 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 241 App. Div. 717, 269 N. Y. Supp.
1007 (1st Dep't 1934), aff'd, 266 N. Y. 525, 195 N. E. 183 (1935).
12 Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, Manufacturer's Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hopson,
supra note 10.
13 Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N. Y. 146, 71 N. E. 2d 443 (1947).
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Section 61-b was enacted to preclude the mischief of strike
suits 4 by requiring security for expenses if the plaintiffs do not meet
certain minimum requirements. Although in any action brought in
the right of a foreign or domestic corporation it must be made to
appear that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time the transaction
of which he complains occurred,15 a shareholder under Section 61-b
need not have the five per cent or fifty thousand dollars of stock
minimums at the time the wrongs complained of took place.' 6 Thus,
where a shareholder acquired by transfer subsequent to the com-
mencement of the action a sufficient number of shares to form the
required five per cent, the section was complied with.' 7 A share-
holder maintaining a suit in the right of the corporation is entitled
to an order, in the discretion of the court, permitting him to examine
the stock book for the purpose of soliciting additional shareholders
to join as party plaintiffs so as to vacate an order for security.' 8
The section applies by its terms "to any suit" brought by a share-
holder in the right of the corporation and so includes any cause of
action whatsoever accruing to the corporation which the latter has
failed or neglected to pursue; " but does not apply to a representative
action, that is, one wherein the right of action accrues not to the
corporation as such, but to shareholders in their individual capacity
against either the corporation or its officers.20
In the case of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation,2'
the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
similar New Jersey statute, which by its terms was retroactive,22 and
held that this section was not a violation of either the "due process"
or "equal protection clauses" and was not unconstitutional as class
24 "A strike suit has been defined as 'an action brought purely for its
nuisance value, with the purpose of obtaining a settlement for the complain-
ant's sole benefit-the amount of the proposed settlement being far greater than
any possible injury suffered by the complainant!" BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS
356 (rev. ed. 1946). See Isensee v. Long Island Motion Picture Co., Inc.,
184 Misc. 625, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 556 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
I 'N. Y. GFN. CoRP. LAW § 61.
20 Noel Associates v. Merrill, 184 Misc. 646, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 143 (Sup. Ct.
1944).
17 Purdy v. Humphrey, 187 Misc. 40, 60 N. Y. S. 2d 535 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
See Weinstein v. Behn, 68 N. Y. S. 2d 199 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd, 272 App.
Div. 1045, 75 N. Y. S. 2d 284 (1st Dep't 1947), where the value of stock was
determined at the date of intervention rather than at the date of commence-
ment of the action. The value of the stock had declined between those two
dates.
28 Baker v. Macfadden Publications, 300 N. Y. 325, 90 N. E. 2d 876 (1950),
reversing 270 App. Div. 440, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 841 (1st Dep't 1946).
29 Schwartz v. Kahn, 183 Misc. 252, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 931 (Sup. Ct 1944).
20 Lennan v. Blakely, 80 N. Y. S. 2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
21337 U. S. 541 (1949).
22 Section 61-b has been held not retroactive in Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 294
N. Y. 180, 190, 61 N. E. 2d 435, 439 (1945), 31 VA. L. Ray. 946 (1945). See
also Mahler v. Trico Products Corp., 271 App. Div. 179, 63 N. Y. S. 2< 168
(4th Dep't 1946), aff'd, 296 N. Y. 902, 72 N. E. 2d 622 (1947).
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legislation.23 This decision also determined that the statute's applica-
tion in the federal courts was mandatory in all diversity of citizenship
cases under the holding in Erie v. Tompkins,24 as being a substantive
enactment creating a right in the corporation which it had not pre-
viously enjoyed, 25 rather than a mode of procedure.
California View
In an effort to curtail the alleged abuses of the shareholder's
derivative suit the legislature of the state of California has added
Section 834 to its Corporation Code.26 This statute, while requiring
security for expenses, established a different standard from New York
in determining when a shareholder shall be required to furnish
security. Those states 27 which follow the example set by New York
all require the plaintiff shareholder to be the owner of a specified in-
terest in the corporation. Section 834 does not discriminate against a
litigant merely because of his pecuniary status in society. It simply
demands a preliminary investigation in order to ascertain whether,
(1) there is a reasonable probability that the prosecution of the
action will benefit the corporation or its security holders or (2) that
the moving defendants did not participate in the alleged wrongs
against the corporation. If these motions are decided in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the moving defendants, a judicial determina-
tion is then made that the action has been brought in good faith and
that it is not a "strike suit." The action is to be stayed until these
motions have been decided. If the plaintiff fails to defeat either mo-
tion, security will be required. In New York the corporate defen-
dant is the only one who may move for security and may do so at
any time prior to judgment, 28 while in California the motion must
be made and determined during a preliminary hearing 29 and may be
made by any party defendant. In the event that more than one
23 Isensee v. Long Island Motion Picture Co., Inc., 184 Misc. 625, 54
N. Y. S. 2d 556 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (not unconstitutional as class legislation).
See Note, 23 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 296, 299 (1949).
24 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
25 Lapchak v. Baker, 298 N. Y. 89, 80 N. E. 2d 751 (1948).
26 CAL. STAT. C. 419 (1949). For analysis of this section see Ballantine,
Abuses of Shareholders Derivative Suits: How Far Is California's New
"Security for Expensed" Act Sound Regulation? 37 CA. L. Rav. 399 (1949);
Hornstein, The Future of Corporate Control, 63 HARv. L. REv. 476 (1950).
27 New Jersey, N. J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-15 (Cum. Supp. 1947); Pennsyl-
vania, PA. STAT. ANN. it. 12, § 1322 (Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1946); Maryland,
MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws Art. 16, § 195 (Supp. 1947); Wisconsin, Wis.
STAT. § 180.13(3) (1945).
28 Tichner v. Andrews, 193 Misc. 1050, 85 N. Y. S. 2d 760 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
29 The motion must be made within thirty days after service of summons,
but the court may extend the period for sixty days more on good cause shown.
In New York under GEN. CoR. LAw § 61-h express provision is made for
increase of security at any time prior to judgment, while in California there
is no such provision for increase.
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party defendant makes the motion for security, only those who suc-
ceed will be entitled to bond. Thus the plaintiff may be led to dis-
continue the action as to certain defendants for which he will be
required to furnish security for costs and to proceed only against those
parties as to whom no improbability of benefit from the suit has been
shown.
By way of comparison, it should be noted that Section 834 is
not as stringent as Section 61-b; yet it is open to severe criticism.
The plaintiff must make a demand on the corporation to bring the
suit, and the plaintiff must submit to the defendant a true copy of
the complaint which he proposes to file and in addition thereto, must
have his proof in final form at the hearing of the motion. This pro-
cedure precludes the shareholder from the benefits that would be de-
rived through a pre-trial examination. Hence, the plaintiff is not
given the opportunity to examine corporate books and records which
are essential to sustaining the allegations of his complaint. When a
complaint is drafted in these actions, a plaintiff generally has suffi-
cient evidence with which to piece together a cause of action; but
there are many details that can only be filled in by an inspection of
the corporate books and records. Without this evidence the plaintiff-
shareholder is placed at a severe handicap at the hearing on the mo-
tion and the odds are balanced in favor of the defendant's being suc-
cessful because of superior and actual knowledge of the internal func-
tioning of the corporation. It cannot be denied that shareholders are
frequently intentionally kept in ignorance concerning the manipula-
tions of corporate affairs specifically for the purpose of preventing
them from acquiring knowledge and information that could form
the basis of a derivative or representative action. Although the
shareholder is theoretically an owner of the corporation, he is con-
sidered an officious intermeddler if he makes inquiries seeking more
information than is given through financial statements. By means of
the preliminary hearing on the motion, the defendant learns the ex-
tent of the plaintiff's evidence and is given the opportunity to defeat
him then and there through the imposition of a contingent liability
should the plaintiff fail to establish his cause at the trial. If the
defendant's motion for security is denied, the defendant is given a
second opportunity of contesting substantially the same evidence at
the trial.
It has been estimated that from seven to forty-five per cent of
the outstanding stock of listed corporations is kept in a street name.30
Since only registered shareholders may maintain the action under
Section 834, all equitable owners are thereby deprived of this valu-
able right.31
so P-H CoRp. REp. Bu. No. 9 at 7 (Mar. 23, 1949); Hornstein. The
Future of Corporate Control, 63 HARv. L. PEv. 476, 480 (1950).
"'See Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., - Del. -, 60 A. 2d 106 (1948)
(equitable owner entitled to maintain derivative suit). See also Recent Case,
23 Taasp. L. Q. 82 (1949).
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The California statute goes beyond the New York section by
permitting any stranger defendant to move for security. The only
liability which the New York act imposes is for the expenses that
the corporation itself would incur under Section 64 of the New York
General Corporation Law. The California statute gives a right of
indemnification to any defendant even though the corporation would
not be liable to reimburse him since he was not a director, officer or
employee.
Although the order granting or refusing security is a final order
or adjudication, there is no provision made for an appeal from that
order.32
California's attempt to control the so-called "strike suit" is
merely a procedural deviation from the method employed by New
York. Both statutes are subject to the same criticism: namely, that
they tend to defeat and discourage the bringing of legitimate actions.
This, in effect, increases the opportunities of irresponsible corporate
officials to plunder the assets of the corporation and to take for them-
selves business opportunities which rightfully belong to the corpora-
tion itself, thereby, indirectly depriving the shareholders of their pro-
prietary rights. In the absence of such statutes, the threat of a
derivative suit acts to deter those who might be inclined to "feather
their own nests" at the expense of the corporation. It is thought
that such leeway and license should not be sanctioned by statute. If
an evil exists in the absence of control over derivative suits, it should
not be replaced by another evil. Remedial legislation should strike
a balance by which neither party to a controversy is unjustly penalized.
While the law presumes that all men will do good rather than evil,
is it wise to build a wall of protection around those fiduciaries who
would take advantage of such protection and reap for their personal
benefit rather than for the welfare of their trust?
In the case of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation,
the court passed merely upon the power and not the wisdom of a
state to enact a security for reasonable expenses statute. This raises
another question and that is, "Is it sound policy for a state to create
a liability where none has existed before so as to bar a person from
the only remedy he may invoke to prevent corporate mismanage-
ment ?" In the absence of a security for expenses statute the plain-
tiff in a derivative action would only be liable for the court costs of
the defendant, as a matter of right if the action was at law, and as a
matter of discretion if the suit was in equity. In no other type of
litigation is an unsuccessful party bound to pay the expenses, in-
cluding attorney's fees, of the successful litigant. Why should one
class of suitors be singled out for this penalty? The essential dif-
ference between California and New York is as to this aspect of the
32 Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New
York, 37 CAL. L. Rnv. 399, 416 (1944).
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statute that in California all unsuccessful parties who have not de-
feated the plaintiff's motion are penalized while in New York all
unsuccessful parties who own less than fifty thousand dollars worth
of outstanding stock or own less than five per cent are penalized. It
is submitted that this is the only substantial difference between the
two statutes and that neither one is an adequate solution to the
problem.
The Unsolved Problem
Prior to the enactment of Section 61-b the shareholder's deriva-
tive suit was universally reviled and deplored. 33 It is conceded that
prior to the passage of this corrective legislation, corporations had
been subject to countless, baseless lawsuits brought for purposes of
extortion and nuisance. Justification, however, cannot be found for
legislation which virtually excludes small shareholders from main-
taining suits placing upon them an unnecessary evil in the form of
a liability predicated upon financial status. Such statutes also en-
hance the opportunities of majority shareholders fraudulently to oust
minority members from active participation in management and de-
prive them of justly due emoluments.
Inasmuch as "In a publicly owned corporation, it is notorious
that rarely will only one person-not already in the management-
own as much as one per cent of the outstanding stock," 34 in practice,
the statute creates an absolute bar, unless shareholders owning five
per cent of the outstanding stock could be collectively aroused to join
in the action. Realistically this is not possible because the expenses
involved in so joining other shareholders would be tremendous, and
the manifest indifference of stockholders in large publicly owned cor-
porations would bar collective organization. In this respect, it would
be well to note that the statute of limitations continues to run while
the shareholder conducts this campaign and so may ultimately bar
his action, if the time necessary to arouse other shareholders to join
in bringing the action is prolonged through the above mentioned
detriments.
Under the statute, once an order for security has been made it
may be vacated by subsequent joinder of party plaintiffs.35 However,
it must be emphasized that although a shareholder may own an
33 For discussions of abuse incident to derivative actions prior to remedial
legislation, see 1942 Lzo. Doc. No. 65(J), 1942 REPORT, N. Y. LAW REvxsioN¢
CODmIssioN 481; 34 COL. L. Rav. 784 (1939). See also Wood, Survey, 82
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF STATE OF N. Y. (1944).
34 Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 Cor. L.
REv. 1 (1947). T.N.E.C. Rep't, Survey of Stockholding of 1710 Corpora-
tions with Securities listed on a National Securities Exchange, Monograph 30
(1941) shows that 96% of all stockholdings analyzed had a value of less than$10,000.
35 Baker v. Macfadden Publications, 300 N. Y. 325, 90 N. E. 2d 876,
reversing 270 App. Div. 440, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 841 (lst Dep't 1946).
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amount of the entire outstanding stock of a corporation sufficient to
comply with the statute, he may be required to post security if he
does not possess the minimal requirements of five per cent as to any
one class of the outstanding capital.3 6 It is apparent, then, that the
statute interferes with the antecedent right of small shareholder to
maintain derivative actions, and gives to corporations rights which
they had not previously enjoyed.3 7
Recommendation
Obviously, some method must be developed to remedy the wrongs
incident to derivative suits, existing prior to and subsequent to the
passage of Section 61-b. The short range approach to this problem
has produced inequitable and innumerable hardships. Prior to any
remedial legislation, many unfounded derivative suits were instituted
against corporations merely for the purposes of extortion and of in-
ducing private settlements. If these actions were permitted to pro-
ceed to final judgment, the plaintiffs would be unsuccessful and yet
the corporation would then be burdened with unnecessary counsel
fees. In order to escape these Costs, and many times to prevent pub-
lication of wrongs which have been committed, corporations have
compromised, and made settlements which resulted in pecuniary
benefit not to the corporation, but to the plaintiff shareholder. Sec-
tion 61-b, while enacted with a view of preventing the institution of
unfounded claims has, in effect, impaired the prosecution of many
well founded claims, and this because the large shareholders are
usually in control of the management of the corporation.
Our problem then is to (1) prevent private extortionate settle-
ments and (2) allow the prosecution of actions by stockholders, with-
out requiring them to deposit security, whenever they establish a
reasonable possibility of success.
In 1940, Justice Shientag, in Manufacturers Mutual Fire Insur-
ance Company of Rhode Island v. Hopson,38 suggested the adoption
of a court rule similar to Federal Rule 23(c), 39 which suggestion
was considered, expanded and advocated by the New York Law Re-
vision Commission in 1942.40 A statute substantially embodying this
rule was recommended by this commission, but was defeated because
of the persistent opposition of large publicly owned corporations.4 1
36 The terminology of the statute seems to indicate this conclusion, but no
case directly in point has as yet been so decided. See note 35 supra and Noel
Associates v. Merrill, 184 Misc. 646, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
37 Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 294 N. Y. 180, 190, 61 N. E. 2d 435, 439 (1945).88 176 Misc. 220, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
39 Fm. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
40 1942 LEG. Doc. No. 65(J), 1942 REPoRT, N. Y. LAW REvrsio- Coimis-
sioK 471.
41 See Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in
New York, 32 CAL. L. Rnv. 123 (1944).
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Under Rule 23(c) a shareholder's suit once started may not be
discontinued, dismissed by consent or compromised without court ap-
proval. The court must order notice of dismissal of compromise to
be given to all shareholders. Any payments made to the plaintiff
to induce settlement or compromise belong to the corporation which
has a right of action to recover the same. 42 This statute is easily
evaded since the plaintiff can abandon the suit at will, perhaps after
the shares of the plaintiff have been purchased by the corporation at
a handsome figure.4
3
It is recommended that Section 61-b be repealed (thus relieving
the plaintiff from any security for expenses), and in its stead Rule
23 (c) be substituted, but in such a form as to bar its facile evasion
by means of abandonment.
This can be done by providing that the summons in the action
be labeled "shareholders' derivative action" 44 and that the clerk of
the court shall, if the calendar is not answered, notify the attorney
general or such other state official as may be designated. The stat-
ute shall then order the attorney general or such other state official
as has been designated, to investigate the circumstances surrounding
the abandonment, and if it be found that there has been a collusive
settlement, criminal proceedings shall then be prosecuted to impose a
fine equivalent to the benefits received under the settlement. Each
party to the settlement, excluding the corporation, shall be severally
liable to the state for a penalty equivalent to the monies received
under the settlement and the statute shall in no way affect the cor-
poration's right to obtain all the benefits of that private settlement.4 5
A duty might also be imposed on every corporation doing busi-
ness in this state to serve notice on the attorney general, or other
designated state official, that it has been served with summons in a
derivative suit and also a duty to notify that public officer of any
discontinuance of such suit by a means other than one judicially
supervised. If the corporation fails to so notify the attorney general,
it shall be liable to the state for the precise penal provision heretofore
discussed. However the legislature may cope with the derivative suit
problem, it is submitted that Section 61-b is not the adequate remedy.
Evident is the law; manifest the evil, and incomplete the remedy.
The ultimate decision must lie in the wisdom of the legislature.
WILLIAM M. MULLOOLY,
JOHN W. FUHRMAN.
42 Young v. Higbee, 324 U. S. 204 (1945) ; see Hornstein, op. cit. note 34,
47 COL. L. Rlv. 1, 14 (1947).
43 See Eisenlahr v. Kalodner, 145 F. 2d 316, 319 (C. C. A. 3d 1944).
44 This procedure has been adopted in actions for divorce, separation and
annulment, N. Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT § 1167; N. Y. Civ. PRAc. R. 47.
,5 Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N. Y. 146, 71 N. E. 2d 443 (1947).
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